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Abstract: In this paper we build a search model with asymmetric information regarding houses' energy efficiency. 
The objective is to shed light on the house owners' incentives to disclose energy certificates (ECs) in the rental 
market. Such incentives depend not only on the rent premium for more efficient houses - as previously documented - 
but also on the implicit rent penalty for unlabeled houses. Interestingly, we show that such a penalty is higher the 
greater the disclosure rate of ECs in the local market. This suggests that the enforcement of the EC regulation should 
be more stringent during the early phases, as the boost in the initial disclosure rate would strengthen the incentives 
for later adoption. We illustrate the theoretical predictions with empirical evidence from the Spanish rental market. 
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1. Introduction 
Improvements in energy efficiency are expected to be 
key in reducing energy consumption and global carbon 
emissions. Yet, and despite substantial policy supports 
to energy efficiency programs,1 the energy savings 
actually achieved lag behind expectations. This applies 
to a broad range of settings, including schools (Burlig et 
al., 2017), commercial buildings (Kok et al., 2011), or 
the residential sector (Fowlie et al., 2018), among 
others. The literature on the so-called energy-efficiency 
gap (Allcott and Greenstone, 2012; Gerarden et al., 
2017) has highlighted imperfect information as one 
important reason for why agents fail to exploit profitable 
investments in energy efficiency.2 For instance, in the 
rental market, landlords face weak incentives to invest 
in energy efficiency whenever lack of reliable 
information about the house's energy efficiency makes 
tenants unwilling to pay more for more efficient houses. 
Thus, failure to capitalize energy efficiency investment 
leads landlords to underinvest (Myers, 2015). 
In order to address this market failure, most 
jurisdictions have introduced energy certificate (EC) 
programs that provide reliable information about the 
dwellings' energy efficiency. Several empirical studies 
have confirmed the existence of an efficiency rent 
premium that allows landlords to cash in the returns of 
their investments. This is true for the commercial 
building sector (Kok et al., 2011; Eichholtz et al., 2010) 
as well as for the residential sector (Ramos et al., 2015; 
Dressler and Cornago, 2017; Fuerst and Warren-Myers, 
 
1 For instance, the European Union relies on the “energy 
efficiency first” principle that requires all energy-related 
policy-making and investment decisions to prioritize energy 
saving solutions over any other. 
2018). Yet, despite the gains that many landlords would 
obtain from disclosing their ECs, disclosure rates remain 
low in most residential markets, even in those in which 
disclosure is mandatory. In this paper, we build a model 
that helps explain the link between the low disclosure 
rates of ECs and the weak incentives to obtain and 
disclose them. More specifically, our model combines 
search frictions with asymmetric information over the 
houses' energy efficiency to create predictions about the 
owners' incentives to obtain and disclose the energy 
certificates. The theoretical predictions are illustrated 
with empirical evidence from the Spanish rental market, 
with emphasis on two issues (i) the reasons underlying 
the low disclosure rates of ECs in the rental market, and 
(ii) the link between the initial disclosure rates and the 
incentives for further disclosure. 
Most of the existing papers on this topic focus 
on the incremental rents obtained by more efficient 
houses relative to the less efficient ones. These analyses 
measure the landlords' incentives to improve energy 
efficiency conditional on having an EC. However, even 
if compulsory, landlords (i) may not be aware of the EC 
regulation (particularly so in the first phases of its 
implementation), or (ii) may have incentives to hide the 
EC whenever it would reveal low energy efficiency. 
Hence, when assessing the impact of ECs, it is important 
to take into account  
2 Other explanations include capital market imperfections, 
split incentive problems, and behavioral biases. 
the potential selection bias that these incentives create. Fuerst and
Warren-Myers (2018) show that correcting for this selection bias
gives rise to an increase in the estimated efficiency premia. In their em-
pirical analysis of the Australian residential rental market, the rental
prices for themost efficient houses are, after controlling for all other rel-
evant factors, 3.5% higher as compared to a reference average rating. In
contrast, houses with no EC are rented with a 1.13% penalty as com-
pared to houses with the reference rating. Our model helps explain
the factors underlying both the premium aswell as the implicit penalty.
From a theoretical perspective, one needs to relax the assumption
that all owners are aware of the EC regulation to obtain the coexistence
of labeled and unlabeled houses (equivalently, onemay assume that it is
costly to obtain an EC so that some landlords decide not to obtain one
before knowing what the EC would reveal). Otherwise, Milgrom
(1981)’s unravelling equilibrium would prevail, resulting in full disclo-
sure: no individual household would have incentives to hide the EC as
doing so would signal that the house has the lowest energy efficiency
rate in the market. However, Milgrom (1981)’s equilibrium with full
disclosure breaks down whenever there is no full awareness of the EC
regulation. The reason is that not displaying the EC need not signal
low energy efficiency but rather lack of awareness. In turn, since this
avoids full unravelling, the disclosure rate affects the incentives to dis-
play the certificates through the rent penalty faced by those who do
not disclose them.
In this paper, we uncover these effects through the lens of a simple
model that captures the incentives for the disclosure of energy certifi-
cates (ECs) in the rental market, including the impact on rental prices
of both the labeled as well as the unlabeled houses. We combine (i) a
search model of price formation under monopolistic competition, with
(ii) a model of asymmetric information between landlords and tenants
regarding the house's energy efficiency. Our search model builds upon
the model by Armstrong et al. (2009) (AVZ thereafter), which extends
the seminal work of Wolinsky (1986) to allow for differences in quality
among firms. In this regard, the closest paper to ours in Fishman and
Levy (2015), which analyzes whether search costs affect firms' incen-
tives to invest in quality (which is analogous to energy efficiency in
our setting). We are not aware of other papers in the search literature
in which the search process interacts with sellers' incentives to disclose
their quality, which is private information.
We assume monopolistic competition in the rental market
since (i) there are typically many differentiated houses for rent,
(ii) each house is negligible on its own, so that landlords ignore
their impact on the market-level variables, and (iii) each landlord
faces a downward sloping demand and hence retains significant
market power.
We use our search model to derive predictions about the rental
prices of the houses with and without ECs, shedding light on the land-
lords' incentives to disclose them. First, we analyze the case of search
frictions but perfect information regarding the houses' energy effi-
ciency: all landlords are assumed to comply with the EC regulation, so
that tenants can perfectly observe the energy efficiency of the houses
once they visit them. We find that more energy efficient houses are
rented at a premium, which is not affected by search costs nor the aver-
age energy efficiency in the housing market. Even if an increase in
search costs and a reduction in the average energy efficiency of the
houses in the local market increases rental prices, the energy efficiency
premium remains constant because the price effects are uniform across
houses.
Second, we assume that some landlords do not display the ECs be-
cause they are unaware of the EC regulation. In turn, this implies that
owners with low ECs now have incentives to hide them. Since some
owners are unaware of the EC regulation, this would allow them to be
pooled with more efficient houses. In this case, the average efficiency
of the houses in the local market affects the search process, and through
this, it has an impact on the rent efficiency premium of houses with and
without ECs.
Our model predicts that an exogenous increase in compliance (e.g.
through increased awareness of the regulation) would trigger a reduc-
tion in the rental prices of those houses whose landlords endogenously
decide not to show their ECs. In turn, this rent effect would increase the
fraction of houses that disclose their ECs.
In this context, an increase in awareness is more effective in encour-
aging the disclosure of ECs than in standard models. Disclosure rates in-
crease for two reasons: (i) the direct awareness effect, and (ii) as
highlighted in this paper, the increase in the rent premia and implicit
penalties as awareness affects the pool of houses that do not comply
with the regulation. Eventually, if awareness is sufficiently high, the
market unravels and all houses comply with the EC regulation. There-
fore, in order to encourage energy efficiency investments through
higher efficiency premia, policymakers should provide richer informa-
tion about the EC regulation in the early phases, when awareness is
low and the incentives for the disclosure of ECs are still weak.
One of the shortcomings of the model is the assumption that each
landlord has many houses, while in the real world owners typically
have only one. We rely on this assumption to simplify the search pro-
cess. Otherwise, when a tenant visits a house, he would not be sure to
be able to rent it as other tenants may be queuing for that house as
well. In a recent one-shot model of price-directed search, Moraga-
Gonzalez and Watanabe (2020) allow for selling constraints, and
show that they are a source of market power. Our focus is not on price
levels (which could be impacted by selling constraints) but rather on
price differences across houses with different energy efficiencies, and
on how the price premium depends on the awareness of the ECs regu-
lation. As long as the latter are orthogonal to energy efficiency, as it is
reasonable to expect, the main insights of our model would remain
unchanged.
We illustrate the findings of the model in the context of the Spanish
housing rental market. Exploiting detailed information about the
houses for rent from the commercial website Idealista, we fit modified
hedonic models using Heckman's two-step method (Heckman, 1979)
to deal with potential selection bias. As suggested by the theoretical
model, our empirical analysis incorporates characteristics of the local
housing market as these affect the incentives to disclose the ECs, as
well as the prices at which labeled and unlabeled houses can be rented.
We find that the most efficient houses (with A or B labels) obtain a 7%
rent premium as compared to the least efficient houses (with F or G la-
bels),while the efficiency rent premiumof houseswith labels C, D or E is
5%. Interestingly, we find that the rental prices for unlabeled houses sig-
nificantly decreasewith the disclosure of ECs in the local market. In par-
ticular, a 1% increase in the disclosure rate triggers a 6% reduction in the
rental price of the unlabeled houses. In sum, this evidence supports our
main theoretical findings regarding the interplay between rent premia
and rent penalties in shaping the incentives for the disclosure of ECs.
The reminder of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we
build and solve a search model with asymmetric information to study
the incentives for the disclosure of ECs. In section 3, we provide sugges-
tive evidence of the Spanish rental market in support of our theoretical
predictions. Section 4 of the paper concludes.
2. The model
Consider a rental market in which there is a unit mass of consumers
searching for houses to rent, and infinitely many available houses. The
consumers' net utility from renting a house i with rental price pi, is
given by ui − pi. The term ui captures the consumer's idiosyncratic util-
ity (ormatch utility) from renting the house,which is assumed to be an i.
i.d. draw from a uniform distribution in the interval [0,θ], where the pa-
rameter θ measures the house's energy efficiency. Therefore, when θ is
known, the higher the house's energy efficiency, the higher the
consumer's expected utility from renting it (thus capturing the fact
that higher energy efficiency implies lower energy bills). In turn, the
distribution of energy efficiency θ in the population of houses is uniform
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in the interval ½θ;1: Hence, the average energy efficiency of the houses
in the market, denoted ~θ, is increasing in θ.
When θ is not known, all the houses are ex ante identical from the
point of view of consumers (as match utilities and energy efficiencies
are drawn from common distributions). However, houses are ex-post
differentiated as, once the customer has visited a house, he is able to ob-
serve his realized match utility. At each visit, the consumer incurs a
search cost s N 0. Throughout the analysis, we will assume that search
costs are sufficiently low in order to guarantee that a solution always
exists.
The consumer visits houses sequentially: he visits houses randomly
until he decides to stop searching.3 The consumer has the option to rent
any of the houses he has visited. The implicit assumption is that land-
lords face no selling constraints (i.e., each landlord has infinitely many
homogeneous houses). This assumption rarely holds in practice but it
greatly simplifies the search model, without invalidating the model's
main predictions.4
Landlords have to certify the energy efficiency of their houses by
obtaining and disclosing their Energy Certificates (ECs).We first analyze
the case in which all owners comply with this regulation, thus allowing
tenants to perfectly observe the energy efficiency of the houses which
they have visited. We will then consider the case in which not all
owners comply with this regulation, either because they are not
aware of it or because they decide not to disclose their ECs.
2.1. Equilibrium pricing when all owners comply with the EC regulation
First, we assume that all houses display their ECs, allowing tenants to
observe θ upon visiting a house. Let V denote the consumer's equilib-
rium expected value from searching in this market. The consumer opti-
mally stops searching as soon as he finds a house that gives him utility
u − p ≥ V, where V is implicitly defined so that the search cost s equals












Each landlord chooses his rental price p so as to maximize his ex-
pected profits, given by the rental price times the probability of renting
the house, p Pr (u− p ≥ V). Our first Proposition characterizes the equi-
librium rental price and the equilibrium value from searching in this
market.
PROPOSITION1. Suppose all houses display their ECs. The rental price of a
house with efficiency θ is given by
p θð Þ ¼ θ−V
2
⋅ ð2Þ


















Proof. See the Appendix. □
In equilibrium, rental prices (2) are increasing in θ, i.e., more energy
efficient houses are rented at higher prices. More energy efficient
houses are also more likely to be rented out given that tenants are
more likely to stop searching when they visit a highly energy efficient
house. Hence, equilibrium profits (conditionally on having a visit) are
also increasing in θ,






The equilibrium value from searching in this market, V, is found
by plugging the equilibrium price (2) into the search Eq. (1). Inspec-
tion of Eq. (3) shows that V is decreasing in the search cost s and in-
creasing in the energy efficiency of the least efficient house, θ: The
first result is intuitive: the higher the search cost, the higher are
the rental prices and the less it pays to continue searching. The sec-
ond result derives from the interplay of two confounding effects.
On the one hand, a higher θmeans that the average energy efficiency
of the houses in themarketeθ is higher, which implies that consumers
expect to obtain higher utility from search. However, a higher θ also
reflects less heterogeneity across houses, which induces consumers
to search less. Since the former effect dominates, there is a positive
relationship between V and θ.
The energy efficiency premium, i.e., the difference in the rental
prices of two houseswith energy efficiencies θ′ and θ, with θ′ N θ, is sim-
ply given by (θ′− θ)/2 N 0. Notably, the energy efficiency premiumdoes
not depend on s or θ given that V cancels out when taking the price dif-
ferences. However, through V, search costs and the distribution of θs in
themarket affect prices and profits. In particular, a lower s and a higher
θ lead to lower prices and profits. Intuitively, the lower the search cost
and the higher the expected energy efficiency of the other houses in
the market, the lower is the market power of each individual landlord.
2.2. Equilibrium pricingwhen not all owners comply with the EC regulation
So far, we have assumed that all owners obtain and disclose their
ECs. However, we know this is rarely the case in reality. Indeed, land-
lords might either not have an EC, or if they have one, they might
have incentives to hide it. What do these incentives depend on and
how does this affect the equilibrium in the rental market?
Let α measure the degree of awareness of the EC regulation. Some
owners (a fraction 1 − α) do not have ECs simply because they are
not aware of the regulation.5 The remaining owners (a fraction α) are
aware of the regulation but some of them might decide not to disclose
their ECs. In this case, if a tenant visits a house without an EC, through
Bayesian updating he forms rational beliefs about the house's energy
efficiency.6
Just as in the previous section, the consumer optimally stops
searching as soon as he finds a house that gives him utility u − p ≥ V,
where V denotes the consumer's equilibrium expected value from
searching. The expression that implicitly defines V is now different
from (1) as the tenant only observes the θs of houses that display
their ECs. Therefore, since V now depends on the landlords' disclosure
3 In online platforms, such as Idealista, the order in which houses are displayed might
affect the order of search. However, from the point of view of the landlords, search can
be regarded as approximately random if e.g. tenants use different settings for search/dis-
play preferences. An alternative model would be one with ordered search, in which con-
sumers would first visit the house they anticipate would give them a higher expected
utility, as in Armstrong and Zhou (2011), Armstrong (2017), Ding and Zhang (2018), Haan
et al. (2018) and Choi et al. (2018). As shown by Armstrong et al. (2009), with infinitely
many houses, prominence has no impact on equilibrium prices even in the case of asym-
metric houses. A full understanding of the implications of ordered search in our context is
nevertheless out of the scope of this paper, as among others, it would require investigating
whether landlords with higher energy certificates have stronger incentives to pay for
prominence.
4 Selling constraintswould affect the value of searchV, thus affecting equilibriumprices,
as it can be seen in expression (2) below. However, since V enters additively, it cancels out
when computing the price premium, which is the focus of our analysis.
5 An equivalent interpretationwould be that a fraction α of the landlords find it costless
to obtain the EC, while the other fraction find it prohibitly costly to obtain one (e.g. the op-
portunity costs of devoting time to complete the EC paperwork is very high).
6 Frondel et al. (2017)’s model assumes that a fraction of consumers are naive, i.e., they
believe that the energy efficiency of the houses without an EC is equal to the population
average.
3X. Bian, N. Fabra / Energy Economics 90 (2020) 104813
decisions, we first need to characterize such optimal decisions. In turn,
this requires characterizing prices and profits for houses with andwith-
out ECs, an issue which we analyze next.
For those houseswith an EC, since the tenant observes the true value
of θ, prices are as in Proposition 1.7 For the houses without an EC, the
tenant does not observe the true value of θ but expects it to be equal
to the average efficiency of the houses without an EC, denoted bθ.
Hence, rental prices for houses without an EC are as in Proposition 1,
with θ replaced bybθ.
In order to find the value ofbθ, we need to characterize the opti-
mal disclosure decisions of ECs. In line with Grossman and Hart
(1980) and Jovanovic (1982), if the EC reveals that the house's en-
ergy efficiency is low θbbθ, the landlord is better off not showing it
and making tenants believe that the house's energy efficiency is
equal to the one expected for houses without EC, bθ. This follows
from the fact that equilibrium profits (4) are increasing in θ. Accord-






dθþ 1−αð Þ~θ: ð5Þ
The first term of the above equation reflects the expected efficiency
of the houses with an EC (a fraction α of all houses) whose owners op-
timally decided to hide it (those with θbbθ). The second term reflects the
expected efficiency of the houses without an EC (a fraction 1 − α),
i.e., the population averageeθ. Clearly, if an interior solution exists,bθ
must be beloweθ because of the selectionbias among thehouseswithout
the EC. If no interior solution exists, the corner solution θ̂ ¼ θ applies.
The following Lemma characterizes the equilibrium value of θ̂.
LEMMA1. (i) Ifα ≥
1−θ




, there exists a unique
θ̂ ∈ ðθ; ~θÞ. The solution is strictly decreasing in α and increasing in θ.
Proof. See the Appendix □
If sufficiently many landlords are aware of the EC regulation, the
houses without ECs are mostly owned by owners who decide to hide
them. Hence, θ̂ is so low that it does not pay to hide the EC, i.e., there
is market unravelling. Otherwise, for lower values of α, the solution is
interior, withbθ decreasing in α in the interval θ,eθð Þ: On one extreme,
when only an infinitesimally small fraction of landlords are aware of
the EC regulation, θ̂ tends to the population average ~θ. On the other ex-
treme, when α is close to ð1−θÞ=ð1þ θÞ; there is almost full market
unravelling. In turn, the interior solution for θ̂ is increasing in θ. Intui-
tively, the average house that is pooled with the non-labeled houses
has higher efficiency the higher θ.
Using the equilibrium price in Proposition 1, the difference in rental
prices of two houses with andwithout EC, is given by ðθ−θ̂Þ=2N0: It fol-
lows that the houses with ECs are rented at a premium, which is larger
the higher θ and the lower θ̂: Since θ̂ is decreasing in α (Lemma 1), it fol-
lows that the efficiency rent premium is larger in markets where a
greater fraction of landlords are aware of the EC regulation. Similarly,
since θ̂ is increasing inθ (Lemma1), the efficiency rent premium is larger
in markets with low θ (and hence a low average efficiency, ~θ).
It only remains to characterize V, which we have so far taken as
given. As before, V is implicitly defined so that the search cost s equals
the expected gain from an additional visit. The latter is now
decomposed in two terms: the expected gain from visiting a house
with or without an EC, times the probability of each event. If the
house displays the EC, which occurs when the landlord is aware of the
EC regulation and the house has high efficiency θN θ̂; the expected
gain from search is similar to (1), but the distribution of the θs is trun-
cated at θ̂ from below. If the house does not display the EC, the expected
gain from an additional visit is similar to (1) but θ is now replaced by θ̂.
This event occurs when the owner is not aware of the regulation or
when he is but decides to hide the EC. Formally, the condition that de-









u−p θð Þ−Vð Þdu
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where the endogenous objects, p(θ) and θ̂ , have been defined in
Proposition 1 and Lemma 1, respectively.
The RHS of Eq. (6) is decreasing in V. Hence, the equilibrium value
from search, V, is decreasing in s. It follows that rental prices and profits
are higher in markets with higher search costs. However, just as before,
this does not affect the rent premium as V cancels out when taking the
price differences across houses with and without ECs.
The above results are summarized in our next Proposition.8
PROPOSITION 2. Among the owners who are aware of the EC regula-
tion, only those with θN θ̂ display the EC. The rental price of houses
with and without EC is p(θ) and pðθ̂Þ; where prices are defined in
Proposition 1 and θ̂ is defined in Lemma 1. If s is sufficiently low, there
exists a unique solution to (6) which is decreasing in s..
Proof. See the Appendix. □
Empirically, it is not possible to test the predicted negative correla-
tion between the rent premium and the average energy efficiency of
the houses without the EC (the latter is non-observable). However,
the fraction of houses in the market which disclose their ECs provides
a good proxy for θ̂: In particular, the observed disclosure rate of ECs




as only a fraction α of houses obtain ECs and, among these, only a frac-
tion ð1−θ̂Þ=ð1−θÞdisclose them. Since this expression is decreasing in θ̂,
and the rent efficiency premium is also decreasing in θ̂;wepredict a pos-
itive correlation between the observed disclosure rates of ECs and the ef-
ficiency rent premium. The observed disclosure rate A is more
informative about the average energy efficiency of the houses without
EC in markets where the average energy efficiency (as proxied by θ) is
higher.9
It follows that a boost in disclosure (e.g. triggered by an increase in
overall awareness of the EC regulation) would imply a stronger implicit
penalty for the houses that hide their ECs. The resulting increase in com-
pliance would further strengthen the incentives for disclosure, giving
rise to a virtuous circle as the unlabeled houses are increasingly penal-
ized with lower rents. Hence, the regulatory enforcement should be
more stringent when and where disclosure rates are low and hence
the incentives for information provision are still weak.
To summarize our testable predictions, more efficient houses are
rented at higher prices than less efficient houses, and houses with an
EC obtain a premium over houses without. An increase in search costs
and a reduction in the average energy efficiency in the housing market
lead to higher rental prices and higher expected profits. However, since
7 Note, however, that the endogenous value of Vneednot be the same as in theprevious
section.
8 It is possible to include an expected penalty for non-compliance, ρF, where F denotes
thefine and ρ the probably of being detected. The critical value of θ belowwhich landlords
would hide the EC is lower than θ̂. Intuitively, a landlord is willing to give up some rent in-
stead of facing the fine. In turn, this would reduce the expected energy efficiency of the
houses without EC, contributing to unravelling and increasing the rent premium of
the houses with EC. Hence, the effects of increasing the expected fine would go beyond
the pure cost related effects.
9 This result in is line with Frondel et al. (2017)’s prediction and empirical findings re-
garding the effects of moving from a regime of voluntary disclosure to a mandatory one.
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these effects are uniform across houses, the energy efficiency premium
is not affected by search costs nor the average energy efficiency. Inmar-
kets with higher observed disclosure rates of ECs, the rent premium of
the houses with ECs is relatively higher. This effect is more pronounced
the higher the observed energy efficiency.
In the next sectionwe explore these testable implications in the con-
text of the Spanish housing rental market.
3. Empirical analysis
To promote investments in energy efficiency, the European Parlia-
ment has made it mandatory that all buildings disclose information on
their energy efficiency (Directive 2002/91/EC). This has given rise to
the Energy Performance Certificate (EPC), which assesses heating sys-
tems, ventilation and insulation quality, among others, with a common
standard across all member states: houses and buildings are certified
with an index that ranges from A toG according to the dwellings' energy
efficiency. Landlords who do not comply with these standards are sub-
ject to fines.10
In this paper we use data from the Spanish rental market to em-
pirically illustrate our previous theoretical findings. We first de-
scribe the data, and then provide evidence regarding the existence
and determinants of an energy efficiency premium and an energy ef-
ficiency penalty. As discussed at the end of the section, the empirical
exercise has some limitations, mainly due to the fact that it exploits
cross-sectional variation across a limited number of medium-sized
Spanish cities.
3.1. Data
We have downloaded cross sectional data of rental advertise-
ments from the main Spanish commercial housing website
(Idealista) during April 2016. Being the most popular real estate
website in Spain, Idealista has the largest number of advertise-
ments and website visits in this field.11 It is thus reasonable to be-
lieve that our data sample does not suffer from selection bias. The
advertisements available on Idealista provide us information
about the dwellings' rental price, their location, their advertise-
ment type, their characteristics, and their EC ratings (if they
have one). According to the theoretical model presented in the
previous section, the disclosure rate of ECs and the distribution
of energy efficiency of the houses in a local market affect the
rent premium. To obtain the variation of these determinants, we
focus on eight relatively small Spanish cities with an average of
100,000 inhabitants each. These cities are treated as eight separate
markets. Our sample consists of 8009 ads that are spread across
these cities.
The disclosure rate of ECs in each city is computed as the percent-
age of houses in the city that display the EC information online. To
calculate the mean and variance of the EC ratings within each city,
we have assigned numbers from 7 to 1 to the ratings A to G, with
higher values indicating more energy efficient houses. The summary
statistics of ECs are shown in Table 1. With only 1506 out of 8009 ads
including EC information, the mean disclosure rate is 19%.12 Pam-
plona has the highest disclosure rate, 47%, and Cádiz has the lowest,
13%. The average EC rating (denoted as AverageLabel) is 4.35,
i.e., dwellings with a C or D label on average. According to our data,
the variance of ECs (denoted as VarianceLabel) ranges from 3.30 to
5.52. The mean and variance help us characterize the distribution
of ECs in each local market. The annual income per capita in each
city is also shown in Table 1.
Furthermore, we have constructed the variable GreenVote to capture
the green ideological heterogeneity of the homeowners in each city.13
We have measured this variable as the fraction of votes for the green
parties in the Spanish 2016 General Election. This fraction has remained
fairly stable across time, i.e., using data for the Spanish elections in 2015,
2016 and 2019, the mean of GreenVote is 1.335% and the average vari-
ance is only 0.028%.14 As it will be later explained, we will use this var-
iable as a determinant of the decision to obtain and disclose energy
certificates.
Table 2 provides descriptive statistics of the ads on the labeled and
non-labeled samples. Relative to the unlabeled dwellings, the rental
prices of the labeled dwellings are slightly higher on average. Also, the
labeled houses are smaller in size and tend to be in a better condition
on average relative to those houses without certificates. The percentage
of houses needing renovation is higher among the unlabeled houses.
As shown in Table 3, one fifth of the 1506 houses with EC informa-
tion are very energy efficient (A label), while 10.82% of them are very
energy inefficient (G label). In our empirical analysis, we have divided
labels into three groups: the most efficient group (A or B), the group
with average energy efficiency (C, D or E) and the inefficient group
(F or G).
3.2. Is there an energy efficiency premium?
According to our theorymodel, we expect thatmore energy efficient
homes charge a positive energy efficiency rent premium. To measure it
in the context of the Spanish rentalmarket, we use a hedonicmodel, ac-
cording to which a product is decomposed into its attributes, with the
price of a product being a function of such attributes (Rosen, 1974).
Our basic hedonic regression takes the following form:
log price=m2i
  ¼ β0 þ β1Labeli þ βkXi þ Λn þ εi ð8Þ
where the dependent variable, log(price/m2), is the natural logarithm of
the rental price per square meter of dwelling i. Labeli includes two
dummy variables, which capture the houses' energy efficiency levels.
We divide them into three groups: the dummy A + B equals one for
houses with the most efficient labels A and B, and it equals zero other-
wise; the dummy C + D + E equals one for houses labeled as C, D, or
E. The estimated coefficients for A + B and C + D + E thus measure
the energy efficiency premium as compared to the most inefficient
houses, labeled as E or F. Xi is a vector of dwelling's characteristics, in-
cluding size, number of bedrooms, and the house condition, among
others.15 Additionally, Λn represents city-level variables, including in-
come per capita and average energy efficiency, which control for poten-
tial heterogeneity across local markets. The error term is denoted as εi.
The disclosure of ECs is likely not random, as the theory section
showed. Owners of more efficient houses have greater incentives to ob-
tain and disclose their ECs, and houses which are in better condition
tend to be more energy efficient. Landlords also take the average adop-
tion rate into consideration when making their certification and
10 The fines for hiding an EC are as follows. Minor infringements receive a fine of
300–600 Euro. These include: publicize the sale or rental of a buildingwithoutmentioning
the energy rating obtained, or failure to display the energy efficiency label in cases
resultingmandatory. Serious infringements receive afineof 601–1000 Euro. These include
the sale or rental of a property without giving the buyer or lessee EC registered.
11 For instance, a recent study of the rental market by the Bank of Spain also relies on
Idealista data, arguing that it is “thewebsite with the largest coverage of the rental market
for the whole of Spain”. See Banco de España, 2019.
12 This number is in line with those reported in other studies. In Holland, the adoption
rate is even lower 17% (Brounen and Kok, 2011).
13 See also Brounen and Kok et al. (2011) and Dressler and Cornago (2017), who use the
same approach.
14 We have considered “Recortes Cero-Grupo Verde” and “Pacma” as the green parties.
We have also performed the estimation with different definitions for green party
(e.g., also including “Unidos Podemos”, or only including “Recortes Cero-Grupo Verde”),
and results are very robust. Recortes Cero-Grupo Verde is the Spanish green party, Pacma
is a party that defends animals' rights, and Unidos Podemos is a left-wing party.
15 Due to the collinearity issue,we cannot control all the house characteristics. For exam-
ple, in terms of house condition,we only control dummy variable Good Conditionwhich is
equal to one if house is advertised with good condition indicator. As for furniture condi-
tion, we control for two dummy variables: Unfurnished and FullyFurnished/Unequipped.
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disclosure decisions. This may be a source of selection bias as we only
observe the efficiency labels of those houses whose owners decided to
obtain and disclose the certificate.
To correct for this, we use a Heckman two-step method (Heckman,
1979) using three exogenous determinants of label adoption: the local
share of votes for the green parties (GreenVote), the local adoption
rate of ECs (AdoptionRate), and whether the house is advertised by the
landlord himself or by an agency (Private = 1 in the first case and Pri-
vate = 0 otherwise). We expect landlords to be more likely to obey to
the energy efficiency regulation in cities with a higher environmental
awareness (as reflected in the share of green votes).16 We also expect
landlords to be more likely to comply with the regulation in cities
with high adoption rates. Indeed, our theory model predicts that the
rent of unlabeled houses is negatively related to the local adoption
rate of ECs. Still, once the energy efficiency information has been re-
leased, the local adoption rate should have no impact on the rental
price. Last, in our model the decision to obtain an EC depends on the
landlord's opportunity cost of time. Accordingly, taking the decision to
hire an agency as a proxy for the landlord's opportunity cost of time,
we expect that landlords who decide to rent the house without inter-
mediaries have a lower opportunity cost. Hence, they should also be
more likely to obtain an EC.
Under the assumption that these three variables are not directly re-
lated to the rental price, they could help us correctly identify the poten-
tial selection bias. As supporting evidence, the correlation between the
rent per squaremeter and these three variables is very low: the correla-
tion between rent and GreenVote is 0.13; the correlation between rent
and AdoptionRate is 0.01, and the correlation between rent and Private
is 0.03.
Firstly,we use a Probitmodel to estimate theprobability of obtaining
and disclosing the ECs using the full sample of houses:
Pr ECið Þ ¼
β0 þ γGreenVoten þ ρPrivatei þ σAdoptionRaten þ βkXi þ Λn þ εi ð9Þ
where ECi is a dummy variable that takes the value one if the house dis-
plays an EC, and zero otherwise. Xi captures the house's characteristics,
while Λn includes the city's characteristics. Among these, AverageLabeln
and VarianceLabeln, which measure themean and variance of ECs in the
city n where the house is located, might affect the incentives to obtain
and disclose the ECs through the effects on the consumers' value from
search and, ultimately, through the effects on prices. Following our the-
ory model, we assume that landlords take these market-level variables
as given when they make their decisions on whether to obtain and dis-
close the certificates. The implicit assumption is that the individual de-
cisions are negligible in the aggregate, so they do not affect the
market-level variables in the rental market. Incomen represents the av-







Mean St.Dev Mean St.Dev Mean St.Dev
Adoption rate 0.19 0.09
Price (Euro/square meter) 6.81 4.69 6.83 4.47 6.80 4.73
Size (square meters) 104.93 137.03 98.36 61.14 106.46 149.16
Bedrooms 2.64 1.20 2.62 1.22 2.65 1.19
WC 1.60 0.78 1.57 0.71 1.61 0.79
Storeroom 0.21 0.40 0.23 0.42 0.20 0.40
Fitted wardrobe 0.57 0.50 0.58 0.49 0.56 0.50
Parking 0.33 0.47 0.31 0.46 0.33 0.47
Lift 0.59 0.49 0.71 0.45 0.56 0.50
Second hand/good condition 0.96 0.18 0.98 0.15 0.96 0.19
Second hand/needs renovating 0.005 0.07 0.003 0.05 0.006 0.08
Fully furnished/Equipped 0.59 0.49 0.63 0.48 0.57 0.49
Fully furnished/Unequipped 0.09 0.29 0.10 0.30 0.09 0.28
Unfurnished 0.04 0.20 0.04 0.20 0.04 0.20
Lift 0.59 0.49 0.71 0.45 0.56 0.50
Advertisement type
Private 0.49 0.50 0.52 0.50 0.48 0.50
Table 3
Descriptive statistics: ECs.
Total A B C D E F G Not available
Sample Size 1506 315 76 123 233 386 70 146 157
Percentage 20.91% 5.04% 8.16% 15.47% 25.63% 4.64% 10.82% 10.42%
Table 1
City characteristics.
Total Cadiz Jaen Pamplona Soria Huesca Oviedo Salamanca Valladolid
No. of Observations 8009 3536 614 540 173 470 963 1186 527
Adoption Rate 19% 13% 18% 47% 14% 17% 23% 20% 23%
AverageLabel 4.35 4.62 4.71 3.30 5.52 4.79 3.75 4.12 4.08
VarianceLabel 3.85 5.02 5.02 0.90 3.08 2.85 3.90 3.17 3.04
Income per Capita (Euro) 25,923 25,994 23,999 29,807 24,498 25,088 27,339 24,462 25,624
GreenVote 1.91% 2.88% 1.59% 1.07% 0.81% 1.16% 1.30% 0.95% 0.92%
16 Label adoption is positively related to the local environmental ideology in Brounen
and Kok et al. (2011)’s study.
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not control for city-fixed effects as these are captured by the aforemen-
tioned city-level control variables.
Table 4 presents the results of the Probit estimation with three dif-
ferent sets of exogenous variables. All three specifications report similar
results.
The probability of obtaining anddisplaying an EC increaseswith envi-
ronmental awareness, as reflected by GreenVote. The estimated coeffi-
cient on GreenVote is larger when the advertisement type is also
controlled for. Consistent with our reasoning, landlords who advertise
their house by themselves are more likely to obtain ECs relative to
those who resort to an agency. Moreover, in cities with higher adoption
rates, landlords are significantly more likely to obtain and disclose their
ECs in all three specifications. In line with our theoretical model, in local
markets where consumers' expected value from searching is higher
(which in turn is positively correlated with the mean and variance of
the ratings), the rent efficiency premiumshrinks down, leading landlords
to be more reluctant to obtain and disclose their ECs. Indeed, the esti-
mates on themean and variance of the ECs in our Probit model are nega-
tive in the last specifications. The average income level is negatively
related to the probability of obtaining ECs, but the effect is non-
significant. As expected, houses in good condition are more likely to dis-
close theEC information, and this effect is significant in all three specifica-
tions. Also, those dwellingswith lifts,fittedwardrobe and storerooms are
significantly more likely to be labeled. In contrast, the size of the dwell-
ings, number ofWCs, and number of bedrooms do not seem to be corre-
lated with the incentives to adopt and disclose the EC information.
With the estimated Probit model in the first stage, we construct con-
sistent estimates of the inverse Mills ratio λ̂. The inverse Mills ratio is
added as an instrumental variable in the basic hedonic model to deal
with the self-selection issue.
log price=m2
 
i ¼ β0 þ β1Labeli þ βkXi þ τλ̂i þ Λn þ εi ð10Þ
Table 5 reports the estimated results for the basic hedonic model. In
the columnswith odd numbers, we cluster the ECs into three groups. As
explained above, Labeli captures the houses' energy efficiency levels ac-
cording to the three groups,A+ B, C+D+ E and the excluded category
F. According to our model, we expect a positive rent premium for those
houses that aremore energy efficient, indicating that the coefficients on
Labeli should be ranked asA+ B N C+D+ E N 0. To show the robustness
of our results, we also utilize the variable LabelRating, which assigns
numbers from7 to 1 to labels A toG. In the columnswith even numbers,
we include LabelRating instead of the efficiency dummy variables. In the
first two columns, we control for AdoptionRate and GreenVote as exoge-
nous variables in the first step; in column (3) and (4), AdoptionRate and
Private are included in the first step; and the last two columns refer to
specifications that include the three exogenous variables as controls in
the Probit model.
Based on the 1348 labeled dwellings in the sample, our model ex-
plains about 25% of the natural logarithm of the rental price per square
meter. Comparedwith those houses labeled as E or G, the estimated en-
ergy efficiency rent premium associated with the most efficient labels
(A or B) is 8%–9%, which is significant at the 5% level when we include
advertisement type as an exogenous variable. In turn, the energy effi-
ciency premium for those houses labeled as C, D or E is around 5%,
which is significant at the 10% level in all three specifications. Themag-
nitude is similar to those found in other countries.17 In terms of the test
with LabelRating, there is about a 1% increase in rent on average if the
certificate is upgraded to a higher level, controlling for other factors.
This result is significant at the 10% levelwhenwe include advertisement
type as an exogenous variable. In sum, all the estimates of all six speci-
fications give support to our first result; namely, that energy efficiency
improvements can be at least partly capitalized through higher rents.
As shown in all six specifications, the coefficients on the inverseMills
ratio λ̂ are all significantly positive, implying a positive correlation be-
tween the error term in the selection equation and theprimary equation
in the subsamplewith labels. The unobserved factors, whichmake land-
lordsmore likely to obtain and disclose their ECs, tend to have a positive
and significant impact on the rent for the labeled houses.
As for the houses' characteristics, smaller dwellings tend to have a
higher rent per square meter. Having an additional WC is associated
with a significantly higher rent. An additional bedroomhas aminor effect
on the rental price, and the rent per square meter is significantly higher
for those houseswithfittedwardrobes, parking area and lift. Last, tenants
are willing to pay more for houses in good condition, while they pay less
forhouses that arenot equippedornot fully furnished. Last, the rent tends
to be higher in cities with a higher average income.
To conclude, efficient labels are associated with a higher rent per
square meter, lending empirical support to the claim that energy effi-
ciency certificates help alleviate the information asymmetry between
landlords and tenants.
3.3. Is there an energy efficiency penalty?
There are several reasons for landlords to comply with the EC regu-
lation. Most of the literature has focused on the rental premium ob-
tained by more efficient houses, as we have also documented in the
previous section. In this paper, we have identified another reason for
compliance: the implicit penalty for not disclosing the certificate,
which depends on the adoption rate of ECs in the local market. In this
section we provide empirical evidence for this claim.
Table 4
The determinants of EC adoption.
(1) (2) (3)
Advertisement Type





Adoption Rate 3.573 ∗∗∗ 3.319 ∗∗∗ 3.353 ∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
AverageLabel −0.00889 −0.0689 −0.100
(0.910) (0.316) (0.218)
VarianceLabel 0.0157 0.00388 −0.0149
(0.702) (0.905) (0.720)
Income −0.0306 −0.0222 −0.0379
(0.267) (0.232) (0.174)
House Characteristics
Dwelling Size −0.0412 −0.0474 −0.0484
(0.546) (0.489) (0.481)
Bedroom −0.0349 −0.0323 −0.0330
(0.145) (0.177) (0.168)
WC −0.00987 0.000678 0.000911
(0.770) (0.984) (0.978)
Storeroom 0.108 ∗∗ 0.0893 ∗∗ 0.0943 ∗∗
(0.014) (0.039) (0.032)
Parking 0.0106 0.00353 0.00146
(0.793) (0.930) (0.971)
Fitted Wardrobe 0.104 ∗∗∗ 0.0735 ∗∗ 0.0716 ∗∗
(0.003) (0.040) (0.046)
Lift 0.164 ∗∗∗ 0.180 ∗∗∗ 0.185 ∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Good Condition 0.289 ∗∗∗ 0.206 ∗∗ 0.203 ∗∗
(0.004) (0.041) (0.044)
Fully Furnished/Unequipped 0.0108 0.0269 0.0280
(0.852) (0.644) (0.630)
Unfurnished −0.0194 −0.0252 −0.0223
(0.813) (0.760) (0.787)
N 8001 8001 8001
Adjusted R2 0.0522 0.0570 0.0571
p-values in parentheses ∗p b 0.10, ∗∗p b 0.05, ∗∗∗p b 0.01.
17 See the empirical evidence reviewed by Ramos et al. (2015).
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We focus on the sample of houses without ECs. In order to deal with
the potential selection bias, and similarly to what we did before, we use
Heckman's two-step method. However, we can no longer take the
AdoptionRate as an exogenous determinant of label adoption, as tenants
might take it into account to update their beliefs about the energy effi-
ciency of the unlabeled houses. In the first stage, we use three different
specifications with GreenVote, Private, or the combination of the two as
exogenous variables. In thefirst stage,we estimate the probability of not
showing the EC with a Probit model over the full sample18:
Pr 1−ECið Þ ¼
β0 þ γGreenVoten þ ρPrivatei þ β1AdoptionRateþ βkXi þ Λn þ εi ð11Þ
In the second stage, we regress the hedonic model for the unlabeled




i ¼ β0 þ β1AdoptionRateþ βkXi þ τλ̂i þ Λn þ εi ð12Þ
Table 6 reports the results of the estimates of the second step for
each of the three first step specifications. As shown in column (1), a
1% higher disclosure rate is associated with a 13.6% reduction in the
rental price of the unlabeled houses when we only for Greenvote as ex-
ogenous variable of label adoption. Column (2) presents the results
when we only use Private. In this specification, the magnitude of the
second-stage coefficient on AdoptionRate is much smaller, but the esti-
mated effect of the local adoption rate on rent is still significant nega-
tive. Column (3) reports the results for the specification that includes
GreenVote and Private in the first stage. A 1% higher disclosure rate is as-
sociatedwith a 1.93% reduction in the rental price. In sum, the estimated
coefficient on AdoptionRate is negative and significant at the 1% level in
all specifications, even though themagnitudes of the penalty differ. This
result is consistent with our model's prediction: in markets with higher
disclosure rates, tenants are willing to pay less for the unlabeled houses
as they expect their energy efficiency to be lower.
In the last two specifications, the dwellings' characteristics have a
similar impact on the rental price as in the previous section. The fact
that the good condition variable now takes a different sign could be ex-
plained by the heterogeneity in landlords' subjectivity when defining
what good condition means, but it is in any case non-significant. There
exists a significant price discount for those houses that are not equipped
ornot furnished. Consumers arewilling topaymore for those apartments
with parking area, lift aswell as for houseswithmoreWCs. The estimates
onunobserved factors (as capturedbyλ̂),whichmake the landlordsmore
reluctant to disclose ECs, are negatively related to the rent. In the first
specification, however, most of the estimates on house characteristics
take the opposite sign, probably indicating that Private is better than
GreenVote as an exogenous variable of the adoption decision.
In terms of market characteristics, the secondmoment of the EC rat-
ings shows the sign predicted by the model. As explained in section 2,
the value of search increases with the heterogeneity across houses.
Table 5
Energy certificates and rental prices.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
EC
A or B 0.0681 ∗ 0.0928 ∗∗ 0.0856 ∗∗
(0.070) (0.015) (0.025)
C, D or E 0.0517 ∗ 0.0532 ∗ 0.0526 ∗
(0.083) (0.076) (0.080)
Label Rating 0.00757 0.0124 ∗ 0.0109 ∗
(0.252) (0.067) (0.106)
City Characteristics
AverageLabel −0.00597 −0.00406 0.0194 0.0225 0.0338 0.0368
(0.870) (0.911) (0.580) (0.520) (0.338) (0.297)
VarianceLabel −0.0667 ∗∗∗ −0.0693 ∗∗∗ −0.0475 ∗∗∗ −0.0486 ∗∗∗ −0.0382 ∗∗ −0.0397 ∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.001) (0.012) (0.007)
Income 0.0880 ∗∗∗ 0.0877 ∗∗∗ 0.0853 ∗∗∗ 0.0851 ∗∗∗ 0.0830 ∗∗∗ 0.0827 ∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
House Characteristics
Dwelling Size −0.551 ∗∗∗ −0.552 ∗∗∗ −0.558 ∗∗∗ −0.558 ∗∗∗ −0.556 ∗∗∗ −0.557 ∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Bedroom −0.0104 −0.0101 −0.00678 −0.00596 −0.00524 −0.00457
(0.545) (0.559) (0.691) (0.728) (0.759) (0.791)
WC 0.163 ∗∗∗ 0.163 ∗∗∗ 0.171 ∗∗∗ 0.171 ∗∗∗ 0.172 ∗∗∗ 0.172 ∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Storeroom −0.0118 −0.0117 −0.0267 −0.0273 −0.0330 −0.0334
(0.711) (0.715) (0.407) (0.396) (0.304) (0.297)
Parking 0.0870 ∗∗∗ 0.0893 ∗∗∗ 0.0823 ∗∗∗ 0.0838 ∗∗∗ 0.0832 ∗∗∗ 0.0850 ∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.002) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003)
Fitted Wardrobe 0.146 ∗∗∗ 0.145 ∗∗∗ 0.135 ∗∗∗ 0.134 ∗∗∗ 0.129 ∗∗∗ 0.128 ∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Lift 0.142 ∗∗∗ 0.145 ∗∗∗ 0.118 ∗∗∗ 0.119 ∗∗∗ 0.105 ∗∗∗ 0.107 ∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001)
Good Condition 0.176 ∗∗∗ 0.175 ∗∗∗ 0.134 ∗∗ 0.132 ∗∗ 0.115 ∗ 0.113 ∗
(0.010) (0.010) (0.038) (0.040) (0.075) (0.079)
Fully Furnished/Unequipped −0.124 ∗∗∗ −0.125 ∗∗∗ −0.128 ∗∗∗ −0.129 ∗∗∗ −0.127 ∗∗∗ −0.128 ∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Unfurnished −0.264 ∗∗∗ −0.265 ∗∗∗ −0.263 ∗∗∗ −0.265 ∗∗∗ −0.259 ∗∗∗ −0.260 ∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Selectionbλ 0.536 ∗∗∗ 0.534 ∗∗∗ 0.360 ∗∗∗ 0.352 ∗∗∗ 0.266 ∗∗ 0.258 ∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.010) (0.012)
N 1348 1348 1348 1348 1348 1348
Adjusted R2 0.253 0.252 0.252 0.251 0.249 0.248
p-values in parentheses ∗ p b 0.10, ∗∗ p b 0.05, ∗∗∗ p b 0.01.
18 For the sake of brevity, we omit the empirical results of the first step, which are nev-
ertheless available upon request.
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The negative relationship between the price and the value of search im-
plies that the rent decreases with the variance of the energy efficiency
rating. Additionally, rental prices significantly increase with the average
income of the city, as expected.
3.4. Limitations of the empirical strategy
Arguably, and despite the robustness of the results, our empirical
strategy faces some limitations. Firstly, to deal with the potential selec-
tion bias, we have used the Heckman two-stepmethod. Thismethod re-
quires the inclusion of exogenous variables that affect the adoption and
disclosure decisionswhile being unrelated to the rental price. As already
argued, our exogenous variables (GreenVote, Private and AdoptionRate)
show low correlation with the rental prices, but this does not mean
the strict satisfaction of the exogenous condition. For instance,
GreenVote might be correlated with the average education level or
with the population density, which in turn could be correlated with
rental prices. Nevertheless, GreenVote seems to be stable across cities
of various sizes and locations, which again suggests that it is not corre-
lated with other variables that might be affecting the rental prices.
Secondly, our sample is limited to the cross-sectional data
downloaded within one month. The variation thus relies on differences
across Spanish cities. Our estimations are based on the assumption that
the omitted variables that could potentially affect the rental price are
not correlated with Label or with any other independent variables. If
panel data were available, we could further control for the heterogene-
ity of cross-sectional units to also study the dynamic changes in adop-
tion rates. For this purpose, further research could expand the sample
to panel data across a larger number of cities.
4. Conclusions
There is consensus on the need to improve energy efficiency in order
to achieve the desired reductions in carbon emissions. Even though in-
vestments in energy efficiency could provide net-positive gains, the ev-
idence points at the existence of an energy efficiency gap which is
driven, among other causes, by information asymmetries. This applies
to the housing market, in which lack of information regarding the
houses' energy efficiency prevents landlords from cashing in the gains
from improving energy efficiency. By reducing such asymmetries, en-
ergy efficiency certificates have the potential of restoring the incentives
to invest in energy efficiency.
In this paper we have constructed a model of price formation in the
rental market that sheds light on the scope of the energy certificates
regulation to achieve the intended goal. The model, which incorporates
search frictions and asymmetric information about the houses' energy
efficiency, delivers two main predictions. First, more energy efficient
houses are rented at higher prices, i.e., there is an efficiency rent pre-
mium among houses with ECs. This premium is unaffected by search
costs or by the average energy efficiency in the housing market, as the
effects are uniform across all houses regardless of their energy efficiency
level. However, the average energy efficiency in the housing market
does affect the energy efficiency premium of houses with and without
the energy certificate, given that it affects the pool of houses that decide
to hide their ECs and hence their perceived energy efficiency. Second, all
else equal, the incentives to comply with the energy certificate regula-
tion are stronger in local markets in which there is greater compliance.
Such incentives are driven by the discount at which unlabeled houses
are rented, which is bigger the higher the compliance rate in the local
rental market. These theoretical predictions have been illustrated in
the context of the Spanish rental market.
Our results suggest important policy implications regarding the pro-
motion of investments in energy efficiency in the rental market. In par-
ticular, a push in the disclosure rate (e.g. through policies that promote
awareness of the EC regulation), would increase disclosure, which
would in turn reduce the rent of the unlabeled houses, further encourag-
ing landlords to disclose their energy certificates. Hence, if regulators
could choose when to devote their resources to enforce the EC policy,
they should be more stringent in the first phase, when disclosure rates
are low and hence the incentives for information provision are still weak.
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Appendix: proofs and tables
Proof of Proposition 1: Expected profits are
π θð Þ ¼ pPr u−p ≥ Vð Þ ¼ p θ− pþ Vð Þ
θ
⋅





V þ 2p−θð Þ ¼ 0⇒ p θð Þ ¼ θ−V
2
⋅
The second order condition is always satisfied.
Plugging the equilibrium price into the profit function, the expected
profits (conditionally on a consumer visiting the house) are given by
Table 6
Adoption rate and rental price.
(1) (2) (3)
City Characteristics
Adoption Rate −13.27 ∗∗∗ −1.522 ∗∗∗ −1.931 ∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
AverageLabel −0.216 ∗∗∗ −0.0271 −0.0336 ∗
(0.000) (0.123) (0.057)
VarianceLabel −0.149 ∗∗∗ −0.0738 ∗∗∗ −0.0763 ∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Income 0.146 ∗∗∗ 0.127 ∗∗∗ 0.127 ∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
House Characteristics
Dwelling Size −0.462 ∗∗∗ −0.562 ∗∗∗ −0.559 ∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Bedroom 0.0899 ∗∗∗ 0.000652 0.00353
(0.000) (0.950) (0.734)
WC 0.196 ∗∗∗ 0.181 ∗∗∗ 0.182 ∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Storeroom −0.296 ∗∗∗ −0.0334 ∗∗ −0.0426 ∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.025) (0.004)
Parking 0.0542 ∗∗∗ 0.0857 ∗∗∗ 0.0842 ∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Fitted Wardrobe −0.194 ∗∗∗ 0.0816 ∗∗∗ 0.0726 ∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Lift −0.295 ∗∗∗ 0.0876 ∗∗∗ 0.0746 ∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Good Condition −0.675 ∗∗∗ −0.0168 −0.0393
(0.000) (0.602) (0.222)
Fully Furnished /Unequipped −0.0587 ∗∗∗ −0.0281 ∗ −0.0301 ∗
(0.000) (0.089) (0.068)
Unfurnished −0.0356 −0.0929 ∗∗∗ −0.0914 ∗∗∗
(0.140) (0.000) (0.000)
Selectionbλ 6.270 ∗∗∗ −0.467 ∗∗∗ −0.236 ∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.031)
N 6496 6496 6496
adj. R2 0.291 0.269 0.268
p-values in parentheses ∗ p b 0.10, ∗∗ p b 0.05, ∗∗∗ p b 0.01.
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− V−θð Þ2 lnθ þ θ 2V−θ
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For this solution to be valid,we require that u− p(θ)− V N 0 for all θ.
Using expression (2) for the equilibrium price, this requires Vbθ: This,
together with the condition that V is non-negative, imposes a lower
bound on θ ≥ 16s−1; or equivalently, an upper bound on s given θ: □











The LHS of the above equation is linear in θ̂; the RHS is quadratic in θ̂:
For them to cross, it has to be the case that the RHS is greater than the
LHS evaluated at θ̂ ¼ θ: Since the RHS is decreasing in α, it follows that
the solution to (5) is interior if and only if αb
1−θ
1þ θ: In this case, solving





α2 þ θ2α−α þ θ2 þ 1−2θ
q 
:
This solution is decreasing in α and increasing in θ:.
Otherwise, if α≥
1−θ
1þ θ; the corner solution θ̂ ¼ θ applies.
Proof of Proposition 2:.All the results have been proven in Proposition
1, Lemma 1 and the main text, except for the existence and uniqueness









þ 2θ̂α R 1θ̂ θ−Vθ dθ
y 1−θð Þ b0:
All the terms in the ratio are positive. This is clearly the case for the
denominator. To check the sign of the numerator, note two issues. First,
for the solution to be valid, we require that u − p(θ) − V N 0 for all θ.
Using expression (2) for the equilibrium price, this requires Vbθ̂: Sec-











Since the above derivative is preceding by a minus sign, the RHS of
Eq. (6) is strictly decreasing in V. It follows that the RHS of Eq. (6) equals
s at a single point as long as s is sufficiently small (otherwise, the RHS
would not cross s). This critical s is implicitly defined by replacing V byθ
































Last, since the RHS of (6) is decreasing in V, it follows that the V so-
lution is decreasing in s. □
Appendix B. Supplementary data
Supplementary data to this article can be found online at https://doi.
org/10.1016/j.eneco.2020.104813.
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